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Pharmaceutical Patents and the Human Right to Health
The Contested Evolution of the Transnational Legal Order
on Access to Medicines
Laurence R. Helfer
I. Introduction
This chapter analyzes the origins, evolution, and impact of the TLO on access to
medicines (A2M). This TLO is currently characterized by a low level of normative settlement and institutional alignment (the “low institutionalization” cell of
Figure 1.3 in Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1). Disputes over the regulation of A2M
are occurring in multiple transnational, national, and local venues, including the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO), the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the World Health Organization
(WHO), bilateral treaty negotiations, national parliaments, constitutional courts, and
domestic administrative agencies. Competing groups of states and non-state actors
shift horizontally and vertically among these forums in an effort to develop competing legal rules over the propriety of granting intellectual property (IP) protection to
newly developed life-saving drugs.
On one side of this contested terrain are multinational pharmaceutical companies and the industrialized countries in which they are based, which argue that
strong patent protection is essential to incentivizing medical research and development. On the other side are public interest NGOs and developing country negotiators (including those from Brazil, India, South Africa, and several nations in Latin
America), which invoke the human right to health to justify restricting pharmaceutical patents, facilitating the manufacture of cheaper generic copies, and maximizing
the distribution of life-saving medicines to millions of the world’s poor. Squeezed in
the middle are many national governments, which confront a shrinking domestic
policy space hemmed in by a thicket of overlapping treaty commitments, diminishing health budgets, and national court judgments ordering the provision of essential
medicines to the patients who demand them.
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This chapter applies the TLOs framework (Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1) to
explain the origins of these controversies and their consequences. The chapter
argues that the current state of affairs arose from a clash between two previously
discrete TLOs – one relating to IP protection (specifically, patent protection for new
drugs) and the other concerning the right to health (in particular, a right of access
to essential medicines, including patented medicines). The collision between these
unrelated TLOs occurred diachronically in three distinct phases.
In Phase 1, which occurred prior to the mid-1990s, the IP and right to health
TLOs each existed in relatively stable but distinct policy spaces. Within each TLO,
legal norms were highly aligned but unsettled, placing each TLO in the upper left
quadrant of Figure 1.3 (in Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1). Section II of this chapter
identifies the facilitating circumstances and precipitating conditions that led to the
formation of each TLO, the degree of alignment among the relevant international
institutions, and the interactions among key actors over the development of legal
norms. It also describes the wide discretion that national and subnational actors
enjoyed regarding how to regulate A2M.
Phase 2, which occurred roughly between the mid-1990s and 2000, involved a
rapid expansion of the IP TLO, in particular, of the legal and geographic scope of
pharmaceutical patents. This expansion resulted from the incorporation of IP into
the WTO as embodied in the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
Agreement (TRIPS) and the subsequent negotiation of regional and bilateral treaties that require “TRIPS Plus” IP standards. Section III of this chapter describes
the formation, institutionalization, and domestic effects of these developments. It
argues that the regulation of A2M during this period was characterized by a high
degree of normative settlement and low levels of alignment (the lower right quadrant of Figure 1.3 in Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1), a configuration that reflected
the ability of industrialized nations that favored strong patent protection for new
drugs to impose their policy preferences on developing countries.
Section IV of the chapter analyzes Phase 3 – a period from approximately 2000
to the present – the most salient features of which were a backlash against pharmaceutical patents and a campaign by developing countries and civil society groups
to increase A2M. The facilitating conditions for these events were an increase in
the legalization and justiciability of the human right to health in international and
national law. High-profile litigation by proponents of strong patents provided the
precipitating events for this backlash. Specifically, the United States and pharmaceutical firms attempted aggressively to enforce pharmaceutical patents in Brazil
and South Africa, ignoring the implications of both countries’ efforts to combat
the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. These enforcement efforts triggered a coordinated
public relations and international advocacy response by key NGOs and developing
country governments.
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The result, at the international level, was a modest weakening of patent protection
in the form of a WTO Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and
an amendment of TRIPS. Galvanized by these developments, both proponents
and opponents of IP shifted their advocacy strategies to different venues. Industrialized
countries focused on bilateral and plurilateral treaty negotiations (including the
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP)), and NGOs and patients invoked the right to health in national court litigation, especially in developing countries, to compel governments to broaden access
to patented drugs. As a result of these competing efforts, contestations over A2M
now occur simultaneously and sequentially in multilateral, regional, bilateral, and
domestic forums, creating a TLO that is both weakly aligned and unsettled (the
lower left cell of Figure 1.3 in Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1). For many governments, the unfortunate consequence is a marked diminution in the domestic policy
space available to regulate A2M. Section V concludes by summarizing the chapter’s
contributions to the study of TLOs.

II. Phase 1: Distinct TLOs for Intellectual Property
and Human Rights
This section analyzes the two distinct TLOs – one for IP and the other for the right
to health – that governed A2M prior to the mid-1990s. After describing the facilitating circumstances and precipitating conditions that led to the formation of each
TLO, it analyzes the degree of institutional alignment and normative settlement in
each issue area, focusing on the legal and geographic scope of the relevant norms
and the contestations among key actors at the transnational, national, and local
levels. Section II concludes with an assessment of the combined impact of the two
TLOs on the domestic regulatory space relating to A2M.
A. The Intellectual Property TLO Prior to the Mid-1990s
This section reviews the origins and evolution of the IP TLO, with a focus on patents and pharmaceuticals. It summarizes decades of legal and policy developments
that commentators have analyzed in detail elsewhere (Sell 1998; Correa 2000; Watal
2001; Sell 2003; Helfer 2004).
1. Facilitating Circumstances and Precipitating Conditions
Patents are exclusive economic rights awarded to inventors for limited time periods that prevent others from making, using, importing, or selling the patented
inventions. In return for granting these rights, patent applicants must disclose the
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invention in a manner that enables others to put it into practice. Other prerequisites
for patentability are novelty (a new characteristic not found in the “prior art”), nonobviousness (an “inventive step” not obvious to one skilled in the field), and utility
or industrial applicability (Ho 2011).
Patents enable inventors to recoup the costs of their research and development
and to earn a profit by charging consumers monopoly prices. From the public’s
vantage point, the patent system assumes that the short-term costs of higher prices
are offset by the additional inventions that protection encourages over the long term.
Stated in economic terms, the core justification for a patent system is the belief that
patents improve dynamic efficiency (by stimulating innovation and technological
progress) at the expense of static efficiency (resulting from the costs of monopoly
pricing) (UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 2002).
National patent laws are exclusively territorial in scope. As a result, inventors lobbied for an international legal regime to protect their innovations in other jurisdictions. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, adopted in
1883 and revised periodically over the following century, harmonizes procedures
relating to priority, registration, and licensing, and it requires national treatment for
foreign patent owners. The treaty’s substantive standards of protection, however, are
extremely modest (Sell 2003: 108–109; Hestermeyer 2007: 35–37).
England and the United States first recognized patents for new medicines in
the late 1700s. The laws of both countries distinguish between “product” and
“process” patents for new drugs. A product patent grants the owner exclusive rights
over the chemical compound itself; a process patent covers only the means by
which that compound is made and allows others to produce the same drug using a
different method. Many other countries, however, expressly excluded pharmaceuticals from one or both types of patent protection. For example, most developing
nations and many industrialized countries did not recognize product patents for
new drugs until well into the second half of the twentieth century. This omission
was not inadvertent but rather reflected a conscious choice to promote the production, importation, and distribution of cheaper generic medicines. In reflection
of this reality, the Paris Convention did not require signatory nations to recognize
either product or process patents for medicines (Correa 2007: 271; Hestermeyer
2007: 28, 37).
Not surprisingly, the pharmaceutical industry strongly opposed the lack of full
patent protection for new drugs. It framed its objection in economic and moral
terms. The unfettered copying of patented medicines was, the industry complained,
a competitive disadvantage for industrialized economies and a deplorable form of
modern-day “piracy.” These arguments resonated with industrialized country governments, which recognized the strategic importance of intangible knowledge goods
for economic growth and international trade (Sell 1998; Deere 2009).
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2. Institutionalization: Venues, Actors, and Norms
In the 1980s, the pharmaceutical industry launched a campaign for stronger IP rights.
The campaign unfolded in two primary venues. At the national level, the industry
lobbied the United States (and, to a lesser extent, the European Community) to
threaten sanctions against countries that failed to protect those rights. Internationally,
it opposed an effort by developing nations to roll back patent provisions of the Paris
Convention.
The “Special 301” procedure adopted by the United States is perhaps the most
well-known example of the national strategy. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
authorized the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate countries with weak IP protection and threaten retaliatory trade sanctions against them. The United States
deployed Special 301 against more than a dozen countries between the 1970s
and early 1990s, successfully pressuring governments to enact IP reforms that
benefitted foreign IP industries, including U.S.-based pharmaceutical companies
(Katzenberger & Kur 1996; Puckett & Reynolds 1996).
In the framework provided by Halliday and Shaffer, Special 301 increased the
geographic scope and normative unsettlement of the legal rules governing patent
medicines at the national and local levels. As a result of U.S. pressure, laws on the
books in targeted developing countries more closely reflected U.S. policy preferences. But law in action – specifically, the application of those laws by domestic
patent examiners – was a different matter. Empirical studies of this period revealed
continued lack of patent enforcement in many developing nations (Buscaglia &
Guerrero-Cusumano 1995). In addition, the economic coercion that the United
States deployed resulted in the adoption of legal norms that developing states either
openly resisted or accepted only grudgingly.
Internationally, normative contestations played out in the early 1980s at a fractious diplomatic conference convened to consider revisions to the Paris Convention.
WIPO was the most logical international organization to host these negotiations.
The specialized UN agency was established in the late 1960s to “promot[e] creative
intellectual activity and facilitat[e] the transfer of technology . . . to developing
countries in order to accelerate economic, social and cultural development”
(UN-WIPO Agreement 1967, Article 1) and to “promote the protection of intellectual property throughout the world” (WIPO Convention 1967, Article 3(i)).
WIPO’s Secretariat achieved these arguably disparate goals by administering IP
treaties, providing technical assistance and policy advice to domestic IP administrative agencies, and hosting multilateral conferences for member states. No other
international organization rivaled WIPO in the performance of these tasks, with
the result that the IP TLO of the 1970s and 1980s was characterized by a high
degree of issue area alignment.
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The opening salvo in the WIPO patent wars occurred in 1980, when India and the
Andean Pact countries introduced a proposal to give preferential treatment for the
Paris Convention’s developing country members, a revision that would have diluted
the treaty’s patent rules, including those relating to pharmaceuticals. The United
States and other industrialized nations strongly opposed any efforts to weaken the
treaty, and they introduced their own counterproposals to expand patent rights.
The competing groups fought pitched diplomatic battles on and off for several
years. When the dust settled in 1985, the United States and its allies had fought the
developing countries to a standstill. The conference ended in a deadlock, without
any revision of the Paris Convention (Sell 1998: 107–130).
The failed negotiations led the United States and the European Community to
conclude that they could not satisfy the IP industries’ demands for stronger patent
protection in WIPO by revising the IP treaties within that organization’s purview.
Dissatisfaction with WIPO was a catalyst for radically restructuring the institutional
alignment of the IP TLO, an issue that is analyzed in Section III.
B. The Human Rights TLO Prior to the Mid-1990s
This section provides a thumbnail sketch of the evolution of the international human
rights regime, emphasizing developments relevant to the right to health analyzed at
greater length elsewhere (Henkin et al. 2009; Helfer & Austin 2011).
1. Facilitating Circumstances and Precipitating Conditions
World War II provided the impetus for creating an international legal regime to
protect the fundamental rights of all human beings. Confronted with irrefutable
evidence of mass atrocities, the victors of that conflict resolved to change international law’s presumption that abuses committed by a nation-state against its citizens
within its borders was the concern of that state alone. During the ensuing decades,
the human rights TLO developed in two principle ways – the articulation and
refinement of a catalog of individual liberties and the creation of new international
institutions.
States achieved the first objective by adopting numerous non-binding declarations
and treaties to protect a wide array of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights. Many of the rights in these international instruments were later incorporated
into national constitutions, legislation, and judicial decisions, providing a layer of
domestic legal protection and remedies for violations. Human rights advocates were
keenly aware, however, that governments are often unwilling or unable to police
their own conduct. They thus supported the creation of international tribunals and
review bodies to monitor whether governments were in fact respecting these rights.
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Not surprisingly, many states were reluctant to submit themselves to external
scrutiny and resisted proposals to create a global human rights court or centralized
monitoring mechanism. Instead, the international institutions in the human rights
TLO evolved in a piecemeal fashion, resulting in a dizzying array of courts, tribunals, commissions, committees, working groups, and Special Rapporteurs. Within
the UN human rights system alone, the number of international review and monitoring mechanisms is staggering. It includes the Human Rights Council (which,
prior to 2006, was known as the Commission on Human Rights); the Council’s
Advisory Committee (until 2006, the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights); the High Commissioner for Human Rights; scores
of Special Rapporteurs and working groups; and more than a dozen treaty bodies
(Henkin et al. 2009).
These trends – normative expansion and institutional fragmentation – also characterized the evolution of the right to health. International recognition of this right
dates back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25 of which states
that everyone has “the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing of himself and his family, including . . . medical care.” The Preamble of the
WHO Constitution similarly proclaims that “[t]he enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being.”
The right to health has been reaffirmed in numerous global and regional human
rights instruments (Marks 2006) and has been incorporated into two-thirds of
national constitutions (Kinney & Clark 2004). The most prominent treaty is the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),
which “recognize[s] the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health,” including “those necessary for . . .
[t]he prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational and
other diseases” (ICESCR, Article 12). Adopted in 1966, the ICESCR entered into
force ten years later. As of 1995, more than 130 countries had ratified the treaty.
2. Institutionalization: Venues, Actors, and Norms
Notwithstanding the widespread international acceptance of the right to health in
principle, state and non-state actors continued to debate the content of the right
at the national and local levels. ICESCR was drafted to attract ratifications from
socialist states, developing nations, and industrialized countries. Such widespread
appeal could only be achieved, however, by adopting vague norms that papered over
deep-seated ideological divisions among these groups of countries (Henkin et al.
2009: 219).
Further underscoring these differences was the programmatic and promotional
nature of the right to health. As the ICESCR states in a famously ambiguous
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passage, each state party is required to “take steps . . . to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization
of” economic, social, and cultural rights (ICESCR, Article 2.1). For many
commentators, the incremental, resource-dependent nature of progressive realization robbed the right to health of any meaningful substantive content, provided insufficient guidance to states, and cast doubt on the justiciability of health
rights by national courts (Fidler 1999: 188; Toebes 1999: 661–662; Meier & Mori
2005: 114). In the human rights TLO’s early years, these normative challenges
went mostly unanswered.
Beginning in the late 1980s, however, one international body responded to
these criticisms. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the
ICESCR Committee) – a group of human rights experts that reviews state party
reports on implementation of the ICESCR and issues recommendations concerning its interpretation – began to issue “general comments” that clarified and
expanded economic, social, and cultural rights in novel ways. The committee
developed a “violations approach” that distinguishes “core obligations” – minimum essential levels of each right that all states parties must immediately implement – from other aspects of rights that may be achieved progressively (General
Comment No. 3 1990; Chapman 1998). The committee also articulated a distinctive tripartite framework of obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill. According
to this framework, obligations to respect require states to refrain from interfering
with protected rights. Obligations to protect “require states to prevent interference
by third parties (particularly nonstate actors).” And obligations to fulfill “involve
the duty . . . to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial,
promotional, and other measures aimed at the full realization of the rights in
question” (Dennis & Stewart 2004: 491).
Through its general comments and review of state party reports, the ICESCR
Committee became an international focal point for the normative development of
economic, social, and cultural rights. The legal frameworks developed by the committee increased the institutional alignment of the human rights TLO, but they also
modestly decreased its normative settlement, as states sometimes sparred with the
committee over how to interpret and apply particular rights. These developments did
not, however, alter the diverse geographic scope of economic, social, and cultural
rights. A number of countries – including, most notably, the United States – refrained
from ratifying the ICESCR and thus remained outside of the committee’s normative orbit. And even with the committee’s jurisprudential enhancements, economic,
social, and cultural rights remained highly resource- and context-dependent, with
the result that the content of rights varied widely depending on a country’s level of
economic development.
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C. The Combined Impact of Distinct TLOs for Intellectual Property
and for Human Rights on Access to Medicines
The previous sections describe the evolution of two distinct TLOs, one relating to
IP and the other relating to human rights. During this period, which lasted until
the mid-1990s, the international regulation of A2M was minimal and unobtrusive.
Every state could decide whether or not to ratify the two key multilateral treaties –
the Paris Convention and the ICESCR – whose preeminence signaled the high
degree of institutional alignment within each TLO. Moreover, those states that did
join could rightfully argue that these treaties did not impose onerous requirements
regarding either patent protection for new drugs or the human right to health, nor
did they contain robust international enforcement mechanisms to monitor potential
violations.
As a result of this international regulatory lassitude, each nation enjoyed broad
discretion to decide which domestic laws and policies best promoted its national
welfare relating to A2M. Industrialized states that prioritized innovation by domestic pharmaceutical firms added process and product patents to their national IP
statutes. In contrast, poorer developing countries were free to eschew such protection and instead adopt policies to increase the availability of cheaper medicines
manufactured by generic drug companies at home or abroad.
Toward the end of this period, however, normative contestations increased in both
TLOs. Within IP, industrialized and developing countries clashed at WIPO over
the scope and content of patent protection rules, and the United States threatened
to impose unilateral trade sanctions to pressure developing countries to recognize
and expand the protection of pharmaceutical patents. Within human rights, nations
that had ratified the ICECSR with the understanding that economic and social
rights (including the right to health) were ambiguous and aspirational found themselves reporting to a committee of UN experts – the ICESCR Committee – which
had developed a more precise violations approach and a tripartite framework of legal
obligations.
Importantly, these normative contestations occurred exclusively within each
TLO; they did not spill over the boundary between the two TLOs. Stated differently,
the regulation of A2M was “partitioned” between the two TLOs, with “different
subsets of [the] underlying issue” governed by distinct legal norms (Halliday &
Shaffer, Chapter 1: 33) that allowed considerable discretion to national governments. Figure 9.1 provides a graphical illustration of this alignment.
The absence of inter-TLO conflicts may seem surprising, given that actors in both
TLOs claimed the authority to regulate A2M. What explains this lack of engagement? During the second half of the twentieth century, the most pressing concerns
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Figure 9.1. Two distinct TLOs for human rights and intellectual property.

in the human rights TLO were the elaboration and codification of legal norms and
the creation of new international monitoring mechanisms (Helfer 1999: 296–301).
In the IP TLO, in contrast, the post-war era’s central focus was the gradual expansion of protected subject matter through multilateral treaty revisions that were then
transposed to the national and local levels. Both sets of activities focused internally
on building the core components of each legal order. More importantly, the states
and non-state actors in each TLO interacted infrequently, if at all, and they did not
view the other legal order as threatening their own TLO’s sphere of influence or its
opportunities for expansion (Helfer 2007: 280).

III. Phase 2: The Expansion of the IP TLO Relating
to Pharmaceutical Patents
The isolation between the two legal orders ended in the mid-1990s with a marked
expansion of the IP TLO, in particular its international rules relating to product
and process patents for new drugs. This expansion resulted from a deliberate and
politically astute strategy by industrialized nations and their pharmaceutical industries to make strong IP protection rules a mandatory component of the world trading
system. These actors achieved a major victory in 1994 with the adoption of the
TRIPS Agreement, a multilateral IP treaty linked to the newly established WTO,
whose detailed patent rules are far more demanding than those required by the Paris
Convention.
In addition to raising substantive IP protection standards, this strategy radically
increased the geographic scope and enforcement mechanisms of the IP TLO. As a
condition of joining the WTO, every nation – including many developing countries
that previously had denied patents for new drugs – was required to accept TRIPS
and to participate in the WTO dispute settlement system. In the years immediately
following the adoption of TRIPS, industrialized countries and pharmaceutical
firms pushed for even further expansion of the IP TLO, demanding strict domestic
implementation of IP rights, filing WTO complaints against countries that violated
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TRIPS’ patent rules, and negotiating regional and bilateral treaties that required
pharmaceutical patent protections that exceeded even TRIPS’ demanding standards
(Sell 2003).
This section first identifies the facilitating circumstances and precipitating
conditions that led to a dramatic “regime shift” from the WIPO to the WTO (Helfer
2004). As a consequence of this shift, the transnational regulation of A2M moved
from the upper left to the lower right quadrant of Figure 1.3 (in Halliday & Shaffer,
Chapter 1) due to an increase in normative settlement and a decrease in institutional
alignment. This reconfiguration reflected the success of industrialized nations in
imposing their desire for pharmaceutical patent protection on other countries, an
imposition that narrowed the domestic policy space available to those countries to
provide inexpensive drugs to consumers. As the section III.C reveals, however, the
exercise of this hegemonic power was unstable and ultimately provoked a backlash
in the human rights TLO over A2M.
A. Facilitating Circumstances and Precipitating Conditions
Two factors motivated the United States and the European Community to shift IP
rulemaking from the WIPO, where it had been centered for decades, to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the principal treaty of the world trading system. The first factor related to dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Paris
Convention negotiations hosted by the WIPO in the mid-1980s. The second focused
on institutional features of the GATT that facilitated adoption of more stringent IP
protection standards and enforcement mechanisms that these states favored. The
end of the Cold War, the resulting rise of U.S. hegemony, and the shift to deregulated market-based economies facilitated the success of this endeavor.
As described in Section II, industrialized nations successfully fended off efforts
by WIPO’s developing country members to weaken international patent rules. The
acrimonious failure of the Paris Convention diplomatic conference in the mid-1980s
preserved existing treaty bargains, but it also convinced industrialized countries that
it would be futile to launch any new initiatives to expand IP protection at WIPO.
Instead, the United States (later joined by the European Community, Canada, and
Japan) included IP protection as part of the mandate for the Uruguay Round of
negotiations in GATT, which ultimately led to the creation of the WTO.
Three institutional features of the GATT/WTO made it a superior venue in
which to negotiate stronger IP protection standards and enforcement mechanisms.
First, as the nation and the region with the largest domestic markets, the United
States and the European Community enjoyed far greater leverage in the GATT/
WTO than they did in WIPO. GATT/WTO negotiations also operate on the principle of consensus, which the United States and the European Community used
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strategically to force disclosure of weaker states’ preferences, block proposals those
states favored, and advance their own initiatives (Braithwaite & Drahos 2000: 570;
Steinberg 2002: 350–367).
Second, the ability to link IP to trade expanded the zone of agreement among
nations with divergent interests. Developing countries voluntarily accepted (or were
coerced to accept) a grand bargain whose terms included greater access to the markets of industrialized nations in exchange for incorporating IP protection rules and
enforcement mechanisms into the global trading system (Petersmann 1996–1997:
442; Drahos 2002: 769–770).
Third, GATT dispute settlement was far more effective than the adjudication mechanisms associated with WIPO conventions, mechanisms that were
cumbersome in theory and never used in practice (Cordray 1994). More importantly, the Uruguay Round negotiators agreed to substantially overhaul GATT
dispute settlement, establishing a system of mandatory adjudication that included
binding ad hoc panels, a standing Appellate Body, and the threat of retaliatory sanctions to induce compliance by states found to have violated global trade rules.
By the spring of 1994, the United States and its industrialized country allies had
achieved their primary objective – an agreement on “trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights” that incorporated strong IP rules into the world trading system. The next section describes the consequences for developing countries of this
shift from the WIPO to TRIPS.
B. Increased Normative Settlement and Decreased Institutional Alignment
TRIPS effectuated nothing short of a revolution in the IP TLO. It increased substantive IP protection rules in several preexisting conventions negotiated within WIPO
and incorporated them into a single comprehensive multilateral agreement. These
standards applied to the entire WTO membership, including developing countries
that had never joined the Paris Convention or that in practice had a tenuous or
equivocal commitment to protecting IP in their domestic laws.
Of particular importance for A2M, TRIPS required that patents and the exclusive rights that accompany them be made available for inventions in “all fields of
technology” if they are “new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application” (TRIPS, Article 27.1). The breadth of this language and the treaty’s
negotiating history reveal that patent rights extended both to pharmaceutical products and to the processes for manufacturing those products (Gervais 2003: 218–219).
These provisions significantly expanded the patentability of new drugs. As discussed
in Section II, Phase 1 of the evolution of the A2M TLO (which lasted until the mid1990s) was characterized by a widespread diversity of national practices, with many
countries eschewing pharmaceutical patent protection on public health grounds.
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Under TRIPS, however, “so long as an invention meets the technical requirements
of patentability, a patent must be granted for an inventive product, including a
pharmaceutical compound, even if it would negatively impact the accessibility of
drugs” (Ho 2007: 1476).
In addition to expanding substantive patent rules, TRIPS also increased opportunities to enforce patent rights at the local, national, and international levels. For
IP owners, the treaty enhanced domestic enforcement by requiring all WTO members to restructure their judicial and administrative systems relating to IP rights.
For states, TRIPS provided two new international institutions: a TRIPS Council,
an interstate body that reviews national implementation measures and highlights
potential areas of non-compliance; and a Dispute Settlement Body with the power
to adjudicate complaints and penalize treaty violators. Faced with the prospect of
robust enforcement at all three levels of the IP TLO, WTO members devoted significant time and resources to implementing the treaty in their national legal systems
(Helfer 2004: 23).
TRIPS’ negotiators recognized that the overhaul of domestic IP laws and
enforcement measures would be complicated and time consuming. To ease the
transition, the treaty provided a period of up to ten years during which developing and least-developed countries were not required to extend full patent rights
to pharmaceutical products (TRIPS, Articles 65, 70; Gervais 2003: 349, 365–366).
It also included provisions – such as compulsory licenses, exceptions to exclusive
rights, and parallel importation rules – that allowed all WTO members a modicum
of flexibility to balance pharmaceutical patent protection against other social and
economic goals.
These transition and flexibility provisions tempered TRIPS’ hard edges. But those
edges were quickly sharpened again by bilateral and regional trade pacts that the
United States and the European Community negotiated with developing countries.
These treaties are known as “TRIPS Plus” agreements because they contain IP protection rules that are more stringent than those of TRIPS, compel developing states
fully to implement TRIPS before its transition periods expire, or require those countries to join or adhere to other multilateral IP agreements (GRAIN 2001). By negotiating treaties with developing nations bilaterally or in small groups, the United
States and European Community used their greater negotiating leverage to ratchet
up IP rights and to “push . . . harmonization forward at a pace that is greater than
is apparently possible within the framework of the WTO” (OECD 2001: 112). They
also successfully “integrated the patent offices of many developing countries . . . into
a system of global governance” that is closely modeled on the patent systems of
industrialized nations (Drahos 2010: 318).
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the negotiation of TRIPS and TRIPS Plus
treaties caused a marked expansion of the IP TLO. These developments did not,
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however, eclipse WIPO as a forum for IP norm development. On the contrary, they
engendered a “competitive alignment,” by which “different organizations and actors”
in the TLO operated “within a common frame but . . . attempt[ed] to predominate
in providing the relevant legal norms” (Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1: 34). Over
time, a “division of labor” developed between the two organizations (Ibid.: 17). The
WTO emphasized IP enforcement and dispute settlement, whereas WIPO focused
on creating new IP norms, administering existing treaties, and providing technical
assistance to developing states. This two-track system facilitated further expansion
of the IP TLO. In the area of patents, for example, the WIPO served as a forum for
the negotiation of two multilateral agreements – the Patent Law Treaty (PLT) and
the Substantive Patent Law Treaty (SPLT) – which extended TRIPS by harmonizing
patent application procedures and expanding the rights of patent owners.
C. The Impact of Increased Pharmaceutical Patent Protection and IP
Enforcement Mechanisms on Access to Medicines
The developments described in Section IIIB increased normative settlement
and the lack of institutional alignment within the IP TLO in three ways: by expanding the protection of pharmaceutical patents, extending that protection to the entire
WTO membership, and creating multiple venues for negotiating new IP norms. At
the national and local levels, these events substantially reduced the policy freedom
that governments had previously enjoyed to regulate A2M. The rejection of product
and process patents – and the lower prices for the new drugs that accompanied
them – was no longer possible for any state that wanted to participate in the global
trade regime. Nor could a state commit to TRIPS in principle and then ignore it
in practice, because the treaty’s enforcement requirements and dispute settlement
mechanisms made shirking TRIPS a far more costly strategy. By the century’s end,
therefore, it appeared that industrialized countries and multinational pharmaceutical firms had triumphed in their campaign to expand mandatory patent protection
for new drugs. Figure 9.2 provides a graphical illustration of this phenomenon.
Yet contrary to the predictions of some commentators, the expansion of the IP
TLO did not generate a global settlement consensus in favor of higher IP protection. Instead, it increased the tensions between the IP TLO and other TLOs,
including human rights, on whose turf IP rules were now impinging. These tensions had both substantive and procedural dimensions. Substantively, TRIPS and
TRIPS Plus treaties required the recognition of IP over knowledge goods, including
life-saving medicines, which in other TLOs were treated (if sometimes only implicitly) as beyond private ownership on public health, moral, or cultural grounds.
Procedurally, tensions were engendered by IP treaties’ more stringent enforcement
mechanisms as compared to those of human rights agreements. These enforcement
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Figure 9.2. Patent protection for new drugs and the expansion of the intellectual
property TLO.

disparities created an imbalance, whereby adherence to the latter agreements could
be subordinated to compliance with the former in areas where the two sets of treaties
overlapped (Helfer 2004: 26–27).
Industrialized countries and IP industries exacerbated the fears of this subordination by filing complaints in the WTO and in national courts that ignored countervailing health policies in favor of maximalist conceptions of IP protection. The
result, as Section IV explains, was a growing belief – shared by many developing
country governments, civil society groups, activists, and scholars – that TRIPS and
its progeny were coerced agreements that should be resisted rather than embraced
(Govaere & Demaret 2001; Harris 2006).

IV. Phase 3: The Backlash against Pharmaceutical
Patents and the Increased Legalization and Justiciability
of the Human Right to Health
The backlash against the IP TLO, which began approximately in 2000, has several
distinct but mutually reinforcing elements. International human rights experts and
monitoring bodies devoted significant attention to concretizing the right to health
and to highlighting the negative consequences of TRIPS for the realization of that
right. A consortium of public health NGOs and developing countries then invoked
these norms to launch campaigns against pharmaceutical patent protection at the
transnational, national, and local levels. These campaigns thwarted high-profile
litigation against Brazil and South Africa that sought to enforce patent rights over
life-saving antiretroviral medications for HIV/AIDS. In the WTO, A2M proponents
pushed for a Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and an amendment to TRIPS
that expressly recognized the need to adjust the protection of pharmaceutical patents in light of public health needs.
These campaigns, and the concretization of the human right to health on which
they were premised, halted the drive to expand IP protection in the WTO and
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WIPO, the key multilateral venues of the IP TLO. They did not, however, expand
or preserve the policy discretion of governments to regulate A2M. In fact, that discretion decreased as a result of competing strategies adopted by coalitions that favored
or opposed strong patent rules for new drugs.
First, in response to complaints from individuals and public interest NGOs,
national judges became increasingly bold in adjudicating complaints invoking the
right to health. Courts in several developing countries ordered health ministries
to provide patented drugs to patients, sometimes with little regard for their cost or
their impact on broader health outcomes. Second, industrialized countries, recognizing the inhospitable environment in the WTO and WIPO, shifted to plurilateral
and bilateral negotiating venues. Capitalizing on their greater negotiating leverage
in these forums, industrialized states challenged attempts by developing nations to
invoke the flexibilities in TRIPS (such as compulsory licenses on pharmaceutical
patents) and launched new treaty initiatives (such as the ACTA and TPP) to reverse
the effects of the WTO public health declaration adopted earlier in the decade
(Drezner 2007: 176–203).
As a result of these developments, contestations over the right to health and pharmaceutical patents now occur in numerous venues at the multilateral, plurilateral,
regional, domestic, and local levels, placing the A2M TLO in the lower left quadrant
of Figure 1.3 (in Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1). These contestations have squeezed
many governments between highly legalized IP protection and right to health rules,
leaving little policy space for domestic regulations that accommodate both sets of
rules.
A. Facilitating Circumstances
The rapid normative evolution of the right to health has its origins in two key documents in the human rights TLO: (1) a General Comment on the right to health by
the ICESCR Committee, and (2) a resolution on IP and human rights by the UN
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. These two
documents, both adopted in August 2000, triggered a norm cascade (Lutz & Sikkink
2001) of resolutions, reports, and recommendations in the UN human rights system
that identified significant conflicts between IP treaties and the right to health and
extended that right to include access to live-saving medicines.
The General Comment is a detailed analysis of the legal obligations that, in the
view of the ICESCR Committee, are implicit in state parties’ recognition of “the
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of . . . health”
(ICESCR, Article 12). As applied to A2M, this right includes four elements: the
availability of medication in sufficient quantity, the physical and economic accessibility of medication without discrimination, the acceptability of medication in
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light of cultural and ethical norms, and the provision of medication of an appropriate quality (General Comment No. 14 2000; see also Hestermeyer 2007: 105). The
General Comment also analyzes the tripartite “respect, protect, and ensure” framework described in Section II. To “respect” the right to health, states parties must
refrain from denying or interfering with access to essential medicines. To “protect”
that right, states must prevent third parties, including private actors, from interfering
with such access. And to “fulfill” that right, states are required to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, and budgetary measures to facilitate access (General
Comment No. 14 2000: paras. 33–38).
In recognition of the progressive nature of the right to health, the General
Comment does not require immediate access to all medications. Rather, it identifies the “core obligation” of states parties as the provision of “essential drugs, as
from time to time defined under the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs”
(Ibid.: para. 43(d)). As part of that program, WHO maintains and updates a Model
List of medicines that are intended to “address the priority health care requirements
of a given population.” The most recent version of the list includes more than 350
drugs for treating infectious diseases, including HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, chronic diseases such as hypertension and diabetes, and reproductive health
(WHO 2010).
The UN Sub-Commission’s attention to access to medicines originated in a statement by a consortium of NGOs that forcefully asserted “the primacy of human
rights obligations over the commercial and profit-driven motives upon which agreements such as TRIPS are based” (Weissbrodt & Schoff 2003). The consortium’s
views shaped the Sub-Commission’s subsequent resolution on Intellectual Property
Rights and Human Rights (Resolution 2000/7). The resolution asserted that “actual
or potential conflicts exist between the implementation of [TRIPS] and the realization of economic, social and cultural rights,” including “restrictions on access to
patented pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment of the right to
health” (Ibid.: Preamble, para. 11). To resolve these conflicts, the Sub-Commission
urged states, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs to recognize that human
rights have “primacy . . . over economic policies and agreements” (Ibid.: para. 3).
A rapid evolution of the human right to health occurred in the decade following
the adoption of General Comment No. 14 and Resolution 2000/7. The mounting
opposition to TRIPS and TRIPS Plus treaties conjoined with other factors – including concern over the spread of global pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis, and the growing number of life-saving drugs covered by patents – to
engender repeated assertions that the right to health encompasses a right of access to
life-saving medicines and that this right has primacy over IP protection.
Statements endorsing one or both of these principles spread quickly across the
human rights TLO. Among the most noteworthy were: declarations by the UN
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General Assembly in 2001 and 2006; resolutions of the Commission on Human
Rights in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005; a 2001 study by the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights; several reports of Special Rapporteurs on the right to health; Human
Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to Access to Medicines
adopted in 2008; a 2001 Statement on Human Rights and Intellectual Property by
the ICESCR Committee; a 2003 general comment by the UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child; and a 2008 resolution of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights (Helfer & Austin 2011: 113–114). Supportive commentators analyzed and extended these statements, bolstering the claim that international law had
evolved to include a right of access to life-saving medications, regardless of whether
they were protected by patents (Lazzarini 2003; Yamin 2003; see also Helfer 2003).
B. Precipitating Conditions
The A2M norm cascade provided a tool for actors in the human rights TLO to
counter the rapid expansion of pharmaceutical patents in the IP TLO. As a formal
matter, the norms generated by this cascade were non-binding and thus did not conflict with the legally binding obligations of TRIPS or TRIPS Plus treaties. However,
as the number and specificity of the statements endorsing a right of access to
life-saving medicines increased, it became progressively more difficult for industrialized countries and pharmaceutical firms to challenge their legitimacy. Developing
countries and right to health NGOs also invoked these norms in international and
national venues to reorient a legal discourse that privileged the private ownership of
IP over human rights and other social values (Forman 2008). At first, proponents of
greater A2M used the right to health as a shield to oppose litigation against Brazil
and South Africa that was seeking to enforce pharmaceutical patents for HIV/AIDS
drugs. But these actors soon switched to an affirmative strategy, invoking the right as
a sword to bring about legal change in the WTO.
In 2000, the United States, in response to demands from its domestic pharmaceutical industry, filed a WTO complaint against Brazil to challenge a provision
of that country’s 1996 industrial property law requiring “local working” of foreign
patents. The law authorized the government to issue compulsory licenses for patents not manufactured in Brazil within three years of receiving patent protection.
Beginning in the early 1990s, the government used the threat of such licenses to
negotiate with pharmaceutical firms for deep discounts on patented antiretroviral
drugs, which it then distributed to patients at very low prices. Human rights and
public health NGOs responded to the WTO suit by publicizing Brazil’s striking
success in reducing HIV/AIDS deaths. After several months of intense pressure,
the United States withdrew its complaint again Brazil in June 2001 (Sell 2003: 137;
Bird & Cahoy 2008).
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A second critical juncture in the A2M campaign occurred in South Africa, a
country with one of the world’s highest HIV/AIDS infection rates. Between 1997 and
2001, the United States and pharmaceutical companies threatened trade sanctions
and litigation in an attempt to block South Africa from enforcing the Medicines
and Related Substances Control Amendment Act, a 1997 statute that authorized the
parallel importation of patented drugs and created a transparent pricing mechanism
that included generic medicines (Klug 2008; Muriu 2009).
After the adoption of the Act, a consortium of forty pharmaceutical companies
filed a lawsuit in the High Court of Pretoria, arguing that the statute violated TRIPS
and the right to property protected by South Africa’s post-apartheid constitution.
The government opposed these claims, but it did not raise human rights or public
health arguments. That changed in 2001, when the Treatment Action Campaign
(TAC) – a South African A2M advocacy group – joined the litigation as an amicus
curiae. In addition to filing affidavits that illuminated the legal and factual flaws in
the pharmaceutical companies’ claims, TAC invoked the rights to life and health
protected by the South African Constitution and by treaties that the country had
ratified, as well as the international soft-law statements cited in Part IVA, which
endorsed a right of access to life-saving medicines. The NGO argued that these
rights should be given priority over IP protection and provided the legal authority to
uphold the Medicines Act (Heywood 2001; Muriu 2009).
The TAC also mobilized outside of the courtroom, collaborating with NGOs and
activists in other parts of the world to oppose efforts by the United States and the
pharmaceutical industry to enforce drug patents for HIV/AIDS. Civil society activism during a U.S. presidential election cycle convinced the Clinton Administration
in mid-1999 to withdraw the threat of trade sanctions against South Africa (Sell
2001–2002). The same campaign also induced the pharmaceutical firms to drop their
challenge to the Medicines Act. In April 2001, the drug companies unconditionally
withdrew their lawsuit in response to what one NGO leader described as “strong international public outrage over the companies’ legal challenge of a developing country’s
medicines law and the companies’ weak legal position” (‘t Hoen 2005: 206).
The victories in Brazil and South Africa emboldened access to medicines advocates to push for reforms in the WTO. In the same month as the South African
litigation ended, a coalition of fifty-eight developing countries called on the TRIPS
Council to hold a special session devoted to public health issues (‘t Hoen 2002: 38).
In a document distributed prior to the June 2001 session of the Council, the coalition
cited resolutions and statements adopted in the UN human rights system to support
a proposal clarifying that TRIPS does not interfere with national policies that promote A2M. This proposal served as the template for the Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health, which was adopted at the November 2001 Ministerial Conference
that launched the Doha Round of WTO trade negotiations (Helfer 2004: 65–66).
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Among the declaration’s most noteworthy provisions were affirmations of WTO
members’ rights “to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all” and “to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement
which provide flexibility for this purpose,” including compulsory licenses issued in
response to national health emergencies (Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
2001: para. 4). The declaration also allowed least-developed countries to defer IP
protection of pharmaceutical products for an additional ten years, until 2016. And it
promised to find a mechanism for countries that lacked sufficient domestic pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity to import generic drugs from other WTO countries
(Abbott 2002). In response to the latter provision, the TRIPS Council waived the
domestic use requirement for compulsory licenses in 2003. In 2005, the Council
made the waiver permanent, adopting an amendment to TRIPS – to date, the only
formal revision of that treaty – that will enter into force if and when it is ratified by
two-thirds of WTO member states (Abbott 2005).
C. The Domestic Adjudication of the Right to Health, the Spread
of Bilateral and Plurilateral IP Treaties, and the Further Diminution
of Domestic Policy Space
Many NGOs and commentators initially hailed the 2001 Public Health Declaration
as a major breakthrough for A2M and a harbinger of broader efforts to dial back IP
protection standards (Sell 2001–2002; Lohr 2002). Subsequent assessments were less
sanguine, however, especially as the legal and practical complexities of the 2003
waiver and the 2005 amendment became apparent (Abbott & Reichman 2007). Yet
even critics acknowledged that the Public Health Declaration emboldened governments to invoke the flexibilities in TRIPS in their domestic laws.
There is considerable evidence to support this conclusion. For the first few years
after TRIPS entered into force in 1995, no state issued compulsory licenses for patented HIV/AIDS drugs. Beginning in 2002, however, both developing and middleincome nations began to issue such licenses, including Brazil (2007), Cameroon
(2005), Ghana (2005), Indonesia (2004), Malaysia (2004), Mozambique (2004),
Rwanda (2007), Thailand (2007), Zambia (2004), and Zimbabwe (2002). As a result,
the price of antiretroviral medications in these countries has fallen sharply (Ho
2007).
Viewed in isolation, this empirical pattern suggests that the 2001 Public Health
Declaration – and the concretization of the human right to health that inspired
it – expanded the discretion of governments to regulate A2M. In reality, however,
the domestic regulatory space has contracted, rather than expanded, over the past
decade. The reasons are twofold: burgeoning litigation in national courts invoking a
right of right access to patented medicines and renewed efforts by the United States
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Figure 9.3. The diminution of domestic policy discretion and the creation of an access

to medicines TLO.

and the European Community to circumvent the Public Health Declaration by
negotiating bilateral and plurilateral TRIPS Plus treaties. Figure 9.3 illustrates the
diminution of domestic policy discretion.
As noted in Section IIB2, many commentators in the 1980s and 1990s were highly
skeptical of the justiciability of the human right to health. Their concerns centered
on the ambiguous content of the right and the inability of domestic judges to make
the financial and administrative decisions that litigation of health rights necessarily
entailed. However, after the detailed exegesis of the right to health by the ICESCR
Committee and the numerous statements by UN human rights bodies endorsing a
right of access to medicines, national courts in developing countries began to tackle
the challenges of adjudicating these rights in response to complaints by individuals and NGOs. The trend was especially pronounced in Latin America, a region
“characterized by rights-rich constitutions, high social exclusion, and systemic
failures of representation by the political branches of government” (Yamin &
Parra-Vera 2009: 149).
In an early and influential case, more than 150 HIV-infected individuals filed a
complaint against the Venezuelan Ministry of Health and Social Action alleging that
the failure to provide antiretroviral drugs violated multiple rights guaranteed by the
Venezuelan constitution and by international law. In a landmark decision, the Supreme
Court of Venezuela ruled for the plaintiffs (Cruz del Valle Bermúdez v. Ministerio
de Sanidad y Asistencia Social 1999). The court rejected the defense of insufficient
resources and ordered the health ministry to seek the budget allocations needed to
provide antiretroviral medications to all HIV-infected individuals in the country. The
order was both comprehensive and highly specific, requiring the ministry to:
• take measures necessary to ensure an uninterrupted supply of antiretroviral
drugs;
• cover all tests necessary for the use of antiretroviral drugs;
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• provide medications necessary for treating opportunistic infections;
• develop a policy of comprehensive medical assistance for people living with
HIV/AIDS eligible for social assistance; and
• undertake research on HIV/AIDS to develop programs and infrastructure to
prevent HIV transmission and care for those infected.
In the decade following the Bermúdez decision, domestic adjudication of A2M
claims increased sharply, pushed forward by advocates who relied on the interpretations of the right to health articulated by the ICESCR Committee and other UN
human rights bodies. National judges responded favorably to these claims, with high
courts in Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Kenya, Peru, and
South Africa recognizing that HIV/AIDS patients have a right to receive antiretroviral medicines (Byrne 2009; Yamin & Gloppen 2011; O’Neil Institute 2013). A 2006
study identified seventy-one cases from twelve countries invoking a right of access to
medicines, with a success rate of 83 percent (Hogerzeil et al. 2006).
Litigation before regional human rights bodies has reinforced this trend. In 2001,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights declared admissible a complaint challenging El Salvador’s failure to provide antiretroviral drugs to HIV/AIDS
patients. The government quickly settled the case after a Salvadorian court ruled in
the plaintiffs’ favor, a decision that “contributed to treatment activism throughout
the region, complementing high-profile cases before a number of domestic courts”
(UNAIDS 2006: 71). In 2008, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights adopted a Resolution on Access to Health and Needed Medicines in Africa
that closely tracks the tripartite framework of the ICESCR Committee.
Yet even as a growing number of national courts were enforcing a right of A2M,
the United States and the European Community were stepping up efforts to tighten
IP rules for pharmaceutical patents in regional, plurilateral, and bilateral trade agreements. Many of these treaties undercut the Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health
by adopting provisions to restrict the very same flexibility mechanisms that the declaration had previously reaffirmed (‘t Hoen 2009: 70–71, 74–75), including the following:
• Patent linkage. Prohibits public health authorities from granting approval to
market lower-cost generic drugs during the patent term without the consent of
the patent holder;
• Data exclusivity. Prohibits the use of pharmaceutical test data for regulatory
purposes, delaying the approval of generic medicines;
• Patent extension. Lengthens the term of pharmaceutical patent protections
beyond the twenty years required by TRIPS to offset regulatory delays in
approving new drugs;
• Second use patents. Requires the recognition of pharmaceutical patents for new
uses of existing chemical substances;
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• Compulsory license restrictions. Limits the grounds for authorizing local drug
companies to manufacture and distribute generic medicines, provided that
they pay reasonable royalties to patent owners;
• Prohibitions of parallel importation. Prevents the importation of generic medicines manufactured in other countries.
In addition to negotiating treaties that enhanced the protection of pharmaceutical
patents, the United States and the European Community also launched plurilateral
treaty initiatives to augment the criminal and civil enforcement of IP rights. Among
the most notorious of these initiatives is ACTA, whose signatories include Australia,
Canada, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and
Switzerland. According to EC officials, ACTA seeks nothing less than “to create
a new global gold standard on IPR enforcement” (European Commission 2007).
The treaty has engendered strong opposition from civil society groups not only
because its enforcement rules exceed those in TRIPS but also because its draft texts
were kept secret until the agreement was all but finalized in late 2010 (Geist 2010).
ACTA applies to all types of IP, but A2M advocates are especially concerned that
the treaty will hamper trade in pharmaceuticals by enabling patent owners to seize
generic drugs in transit between countries that are not parties to the treaty (Grosse
Ruse-Khan 2011; Yu 2012).
These developments have had two consequences in the A2M TLO. The first,
which relates to the TLO’s formal legal rules, has been to constrict the autonomy of
national governments to decide how best to meet the health needs of their populations. On the one hand, the expansion of pharmaceutical patents has sharply limited opportunities to import, approve, manufacture, and distribute generic drugs
to the patients who need them. On the other hand, domestic courts have invoked
right to health clauses in national constitutions and human rights treaties to compel
governments to provide such medicines, in some instances without regard to cost.
A few commentators have called for a further diminution of government discretion,
arguing that “states must use TRIPS flexibilities to fulfill their duties under the right
to health, and that they must negotiate less restrictive intellectual property rights in
bilateral free-trade agreements” (Forman 2007: 345).
A second consequence relates to law in action versus law on the books. The influence of formal legal rules is often dependent on their application in practice by key
actors. In the IP system, the front-line decision makers include officials in domestic IP administrative agencies who review patent applications from pharmaceutical companies. Studies of these agencies in India and Central and South America
reveal that agency officials have considerable latitude to apply national IP laws in
ways that limit the number of pharmaceutical patents granted in a given jurisdiction
(Helfer et al. 2009; Kapczynski 2009; Dreyfuss & Rodríguez-Garavito 2014;). Over
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the past few years, however, developing countries have come under pressure from
industrialized nations to reduce or eliminate the discretion of agency officials. The
patent linkage and data exclusivity rules discussed earlier in this section are the most
common manifestations of this trend. Another recent example concerns the controversies relating to the power of Brazil’s National Health Surveillance Agency
(ANVISA) to review drug patents granted by the National Institute of Industrial
Property (INPI), the Brazilian administrative body responsible for patent examinations and registrations (Center for Strategic Studies and Debates 2013: ch. 8).

V. Conclusion
By charting the evolution of IP and human rights rules governing access to medicines, this chapter makes three contributions to the study of TLOs. First, the chapter
questions the conventional wisdom that the A2M issue area is characterized by high
legalization of IP protection (obligatory and precise rules governing pharmaceutical
patents with strong adjudication and enforcement mechanisms) and low legalization
of the human right to health (hortatory and vague norms with few opportunities for
adjudication or enforcement). The chapter further demonstrates that the legalization
of the right to health in general and A2M in particular has increased sharply over the
past decade, primarily in reaction to a previous period of rapid expansion of pharmaceutical patent protection rules. The result is a TLO characterized by ongoing highprofile clashes over competing legal rules in a broad and diverse array of venues.
Second, the chapter analyzes the mechanisms and strategies used by different
groups of countries and coalitions of non-state actors to develop competing legal
norms relating to the intersection of the human rights and IP TLOs. These include:
(1) expanding the number of multilateral, regional, plurilateral, and bilateral venues
in which treaties and soft-law norms are adopted; (2) opportunistically shifting negotiations among these venues; and (3) regulating how different countries implement
international rules in their domestic legal orders.
These mechanisms and strategies highlight several insights of the TLO framework. First, they show that studies of normative settlement and institutional alignment are incomplete unless they consider interactions at the transnational, national,
and local levels (Halliday & Shaffer, Chapter 1). Second, they suggest that scholars
must pay careful attention to “defining the boundaries of TLOs and changes in their
boundaries over time” (Ibid.: 20). And third, they demonstrate that the formation of
a new TLO in response to competitive interactions between two formerly discrete
TLOs can engender rapid unsettlement and a misalignment of norms and institutions that had been stable and uncontested for an extended period of time (Ibid.).
Third, this chapter highlights that the diachronic processes of normative contestation between and within TLOs can engender negative consequences – in particular,
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by reducing the policy discretion of governments as norms that are ambiguous and
limited in scope become more precise, expansive, and enforceable. Other scholars have argued that the “strategic inconsistency” of international rules within
“regime complexes” increases discretion by allowing national governments to pick
and choose which international rules to follow (Raustiala & Victor 2004: 301–305).
This chapter suggests a contrary conclusion that future studies of TLOs may wish to
explore: that highly contested international rules constrain, rather than expand, the
policy space available to governments when those rules are transposed into national
and sub-national legal systems and can be invoked and enforced by competing
groups of domestic actors.
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